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Abstract
Children’s understanding of naïve psychology is the main focus of this study. Research evidence 
suggests that 2- and 3-year-olds understand some aspects of naïve psychology. By 4 years, they 
develop internal representations of mental states. Previous studies have also reported cross-
cultural variations in naïve psychology development. The majority of this research has focused 
on Western individualistic societies such as Australia, Europe and North America, and Eastern 
collectivism societies such as China and Japan. Singapore with its blend of Eastern and Western 
values represents a unique case for comparison with Western societies. This paper reports a cross-
cultural study of young children’s developing understanding of naïve psychology in Edinburgh, 
UK and Singapore. It addresses three main questions: (a) Are there cross-cultural diﬀerences in 
the development of naïve psychology?; (b) What are children’s performance sequences on naïve 
psychology tasks?; and (c) Are naïve psychology concepts coherent? The participants were 87 
children from the UK (n=43, mean age 2 years 4 months) and Singapore (n=44, mean age 2 
years 5 months). This study incorporated several established tasks of pretence, desires, emotions, 
perceptions, appearance-reality and false-beliefs to investigate children’s understanding of 
non-representational and representational mental states. The results showed no gross cross-
cultural diﬀerences. However, signiﬁcant cultural diﬀerences in performance on two tasks and 
diﬀerences in the coherence of naïve psychology concepts were identiﬁed. The results highlight 
the importance of considering subtle cultural inﬂuences on children’s developing understanding 
of various aspects of naïve psychology.
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Children’s developing understanding of the mind can be viewed as an unfold-
ing sequence of naïve psychology concepts that change gradually from 
birth and throughout the preschool years. Naïve psychology encompasses 
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understanding and attribution of various mental states, traits and processes 
to oneself and others (see Forguson and Gopnik, 1988). Most theories of the 
nature of naïve psychology are devised principally on research ﬁndings from 
children living in the West. However, social and cultural values, norms and 
practices may play a crucial role in shaping when and how children acquire 
naïve psychology. The aim of this paper is to examine the development of 
early naïve psychology among 2-year-olds in two cultural contexts. First, we 
will brieﬂy review evidence from Western countries and then explore issues of 
cross-cultural universals and diﬀerences in young children’s naïve psychology.
Development of Naïve Psychology in Western Countries
Early in life infants begin to acquire several interconnected foundations of 
naïve psychology including: deferred imitation, self-recognition, synchronic 
imitation, pretend play, joint attention and symbolic gestures (e.g., Leslie, 
1987; Meltzoﬀ, 1995; Asendorpf et al., 1996; Charman et al., 2000; Nielsen 
and Dissanayake, 2000, 2004; Tomasello and Haberi, 2003; Liszkowski et al., 
2004). Between infancy and the age of 2 years children develop a rudimentary 
understanding of some key aspects of naïve psychology. A distinction can be 
drawn between ‘non-representational’ and ‘representational’ concepts. Among 
children younger than 2 years, their naïve psychology remains largely non-
representational (e.g., Perner, 1991; Gopnik and Wellman, 1992; Gopnik 
et al., 1994).
Children learn to use their imagination to substitute real objects and invent 
pretend situations from around 18 months of age (e.g., Leslie, 1987, 1988, 
1994; 2005; Nielsen and Dissanayake, 2004). By approximately 2 years 
children can understand pretence scenarios and transformations in shared 
pretence (e.g., Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993; Walker-Andrews and Kahana-
Kalman, 1999), display a variety of pretence skills (e.g., Harris and Kavanaugh, 
1993) and conceptualise pretence as an intentional activity (e.g., Rakoczy 
et al., 2004). However, they may have diﬃculty distinguishing pretence from 
reality (e.g., DiLalla and Watson, 1988). It has been suggested that there is 
an innate cognitive mechanism for pretence (see discussions in Leslie, 1987, 
1988, 1994; Harris, 1994; Lillard, 2002; Friedman and Leslie, 2007). How-
ever, while the development of pretence skills may have a biological under-
pinning, culture-speciﬁc experiences and environmental inﬂuences have also 
been suggested to contribute to diﬀerences in play behaviours, frequency of 
social pretend play, communicative strategies and pretend play themes (e.g., 
Farver et al., 1995; Farver and Shin, 1997).
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Children also develop a psychological understanding of subjective desire 
at around 18 months (Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997). They understand 
that desires are internal states directed towards objects and that the desired 
objects give happiness and the undesired objects may cause negative feelings. 
This demonstrates an understanding that diﬀerent people may have diﬀer-
ent desires directed toward the same object. The link between desires, actions 
and emotions begins to be conceptualised by around 2 to 3 years of age. For 
instance, Wellman and Woolley (1990, Experiment 1) reported that 2-year-
olds (range 31–37 months) can predict actions and reactions related to simple 
desires. While 2-year-olds failed discrepant belief reasoning tasks, they passed 
comparable desire reasoning tasks, demonstrating an understanding of desires 
before beliefs (Experiment 2).
Children come to understand that someone else may see something that 
they do not by 2½ years of age (level-1 perspective-taking; Masangkay et al., 
1974; Flavell et al., 1981). Although 2-year-olds can solve level-1 perspec-
tive-taking problems, they have diﬃculty solving level-2 perspective-taking 
problems. They fail to understand that another person could see something 
in a diﬀerent way than they do (Masangkay et al., 1974; Flavell et al., 1981). 
Level-1 perspective-taking is non-representational because it only requires a 
child to demonstrate an understanding that other people perceive a diﬀerent 
object from themselves. By contrast, level-2 perspective-taking is representa-
tional because it requires a child to understand that people can represent a 
single object in two diﬀerent ways (Flavell, 1988). Two-year-olds also have 
diﬃculty distinguishing between appearance and reality (Flavell, 1986, 1993; 
Flavell et al., 1983a, 1986).
Several studies have also shown that younger children have diﬃculties 
understanding representational change (e.g., Gopnik and Slaughter, 1991) 
and false beliefs (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Children are considered to 
have a representational understanding when they demonstrate knowledge of 
their own mental representation and that another person can hold a mental 
representation diﬀerent from their own (Forguson and Gopnik, 1988). These 
representational concepts are a later developmental achievement.
There are a variety of interpretations of the empirical evidence relating to 
the development of naïve psychology in young children. One of the key issues 
concerns the extent to which young children’s naïve psychology concepts 
can be described as theoretical and coherent (Gopnik, 1988, 1996, 2003; 
Astington and Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik and Wellman, 1992, 1994; Gopnik 
et al., 2001). Numerous studies have found correlations among performance 
of false-belief, appearance-reality distinction, representational change and 
visual perspective-taking tasks (e.g., Flavell et al., 1986, 1992; Gopnik and 
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Astington, 1988; Moore et al., 1990; Astington and Gopnik, 1991; Slaughter 
and Gopnik, 1996; Taylor and Carlson, 1997; Call and Tomasello, 1999). 
The coherence account in children’s conceptual development has been a major 
proposition put forth by theorists to explain “why the child’s theory of mind 
really is a theory” (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992: 145).
In sum, 2-year-old children in Western countries have been shown to hold 
a number of naïve psychology concepts, which develop in a broad sequence 
and which some suggest are coherent and form a naïve theory. However, do 
children growing up in other cultures reveal a similar pattern of development 
in naïve psychology?
Cultural Universals and Diﬀerences in Naïve Psychology
Most studies examining the inﬂuence of culture on the development of naïve 
psychology have focused on a single country, continent, or region, including: 
Africa (e.g., Avis and Harris, 1991), Asia (e.g., Flavell et al., 1983b; Naito 
et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1999; Tardif and Wellman, 2000), Australia (e.g., Siegal 
and Beattie, 1991; Nielsen and Dissanayake, 2004), North America (e.g., 
Gopnik and Astington, 1988; Wellman and Bartsch, 1988; Moses and 
Flavell, 1990; Wellman and Woolley, 1990; Gopnik and Slaughter, 1991; 
Moses, 1993), Europe (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Brown and Dunn, 
1991; Perner et al., 1987) and the Middle East (e.g., Yazdi et al., 2006). These 
studies provide evidence that the development of understanding of internal 
mental states such as pretence, desires, emotions, perceptions, intentions and 
beliefs corresponds with a similar marked shift between 2 and 5 years of age 
in a variety of diﬀerent cultures. A few studies have made direct cross-cultural 
comparisons. For example, Callaghan et al. (2005) found consistent patterns 
in false-belief performance in Canada, India, Peru, Samoa and Thailand, with 
children passing the false-belief task at approximately 5 years of age. Further-
more, a meta-analysis of 178 studies of children’s false-belief task performance, 
conducted by Wellman et al. (2001), showed that children’s understanding of 
beliefs develops similarly across cultures.
Other studies, by contrast, have found cultural diﬀerences revealing that the 
dynamics of culture is a meaningful force in children’s cognitive development. 
Vinden (1996) reported poor performance on false-belief and representational 
change tasks among children in Peru compared to Western norms. Vinden 
(1999) studied four groups of children living in Papua New Guinea: Western 
children and non-Western children from three cultural groups (Mofu, Tolai 
and Tainae). Vinden (1999) demonstrated a one-year time lag in false-belief 
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performance among the non-Western children. Furthermore, the Western 
cohort showed a lag of a year behind typical Western norms. A similar delay 
in false-belief understanding was also found in a study of Mofu children in 
Cameroon compared to Western norms (Vinden, 2002). Cross-cultural dif-
ferences have similarly been reported in other naïve psychology tasks, such as 
mental-reality distinction (e.g., Wahi and Johri, 1994).
Where cultural diﬀerences have been identiﬁed it is often between cultures 
located on the extreme end of the individualism–collectivism spectrum. The 
majority of studies investigated false-belief understanding in children aged 
3 years and above. For example, comparisons between Western countries 
and collectivist cultures such as China and Japan have been made. Naito and 
Koyama (2006) revealed that Japanese children only acquired an understand-
ing of false-belief at around 6 to 7 years of age, a year and a half later than 
Western samples. Moreover, they found a cultural diﬀerence in that Japanese 
children explain action based on behavioural and situation cues rather than on 
their mental states. Naito (2003) also showed that Japanese children’s false-
belief understanding emerges later than Western norms. Ruﬀman et al. (1998, 
Experiment 4) found that Japanese children performed more poorly on false-
beliefs and understanding of sources of knowledge gained by seeing or feeling 
in comparison to British and Canadian children.
Comparisons of Chinese and Western cultures have also revealed cul-
tural diﬀerences. Similar patterns of performance on the false-belief task was 
reported in a meta-analysis of 196 conditions from mainland China and 
Hong Kong as compared to 155 conditions from North America (Liu et al., 
2008). However, systematic cultural diﬀerences were also found, with chil-
dren from North America performing at above chance levels up to 2 years 
before children from Chinese cultures. Interestingly, against prediction, chil-
dren from China passed the task signiﬁcantly earlier than children from Hong 
Kong. Wellman et al. (2006) demonstrated that Chinese children in China 
showed a sequence of development similar to that found by Wellman and Liu 
(2004) in children living in the United States and Australia. Both Western 
and Chinese children understood desires before knowledge and false-belief, 
followed by hidden emotions. However, subtle diﬀerences were also reported. 
Western children performed better on the diverse-beliefs tasks compared to 
the knowledge-ignorance task, whereas the order was reversed for the Chinese 
sample. Wellman et al. (2006) attributed the diﬀerent sequences of under-
standing to diﬀerent cultural emphases on beliefs and perspectives. Western 
culture emphasises belief and diverse belief, whereas Chinese culture accentu-
ates knowledge acquisition. In contrast, the results of Sabbagh et al. (2006) 
revealed that while preschoolers in China outperformed their United States 
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counterparts from a previously studied sample (Carlson and Moses, 2001) on 
executive function tasks, there was no cross-cultural diﬀerence in performance 
on false-belief, deception and appearance-reality tasks.
Researchers have explained the diﬀerences in naïve psychology develop-
ment between Western and Eastern cultures in terms of a variety of inﬂu-
ences including: language diﬀerences such as bilingualism (e.g., Kobayashi 
et al., 2007, 2008) and speciﬁc false-belief terminology in Mandarin (e.g., Lee 
et al., 1999), social diﬀerences such as socio-economic status, parental factors, 
family composition and child-rearing practices (e.g., Wellman et al., 2006; 
Liu et al. 2008), diﬀerences in cultural experiences (e.g., Vinden, 1996; Naito 
and Koyama, 2006) and cross-cultural diﬀerences in executive function abil-
ity (e.g., Chasiotis et al., 2006; Sabbagh et al., 2006). Liu et al. (2008) point 
out that these factors are likely to have an inﬂuence on naïve psychology in 
complex and interactive ways.
The mixed pattern of results is further confused by the fact that even within 
Western cultures performance on naïve psychology tasks is not uniform within 
age (e.g., Wellman and Estes, 1986; Wellman and Bartsch, 1988; Bartsch 
and Wellman, 1989; Chandler et al., 1989; Flavell et al., 1990; Lewis and 
Osborne, 1990; Freeman et al., 1991; Mitchell and Lacohee, 1991; Siegal 
and Beattie, 1991; Robinson and Mitchell, 1992; Moses, 1993; Sullivan and 
Winner, 1993; Chandler and Hala, 1994; Carlson et al., 1998; Surian and 
Leslie, 1999). This could be attributed to a range of methodological issues but 
also raises the possibility of important within-culture variations in naïve psy-
chology. Some studies have provided evidence that within culture, the rates 
of development will vary according to number of siblings (e.g., Perner et al., 
1994; Jenkins and Astington, 1996); birth order (e.g., Ruﬀman et al., 1998; 
Howe et al., 2005); availability of extended family members (e.g., Lewis et al., 
1996); socioeconomic status (e.g., Holmes et al., 1996; Cutting and Dunn, 
1999; Garner et al., 2005), parenting style (e.g., Ruﬀman et al., 1999, 2006; 
Vinden, 2001); language development (e.g., Astington, 2001; Astington and 
Baird, 2005); within-family communication about mental states (e.g., Dunn 
and Dale, 1984; Dunn et al., 1987, 1991; Youngblade and Dunn, 1995; Ruﬀ-
man et al., 2002); genetic inﬂuences (e.g., Hughes and Cutting, 1999); and 
family relationships (e.g., Hughes et al., 2005). These subtle diﬀerences are 
also likely to be evident between cultures and while gross cultural diﬀerences 
are important more subtle cultural variations, particularly where cultures are 
distinct but similar, should not be ignored.
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Present Study
The aim of this study is to investigate 2-year-old children’s understanding of 
various aspects of naïve psychology in two diﬀerent cultural contexts, namely, 
the UK and Singapore, using a large battery of non-representational and rep-
resentational naïve psychology tasks. In addition, a parental questionnaire on 
demographics was collected.
Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland and is a cosmopolitan UK city, with a 
population of 471 650 (General Register Oﬃce for Scotland, 2008), compris-
ing 95.9% White, 1.5% from ethnic groups of Indian sub-continent, 0.8% 
Chinese and 1.8% from other ethnic groups (City of Edinburgh Council, 
2001). Singapore is a multi-ethnic city-state with a resident population of 3.6 
million, comprising 74.7% Chinese, 13.6% Malays, 8.9% Indians and 2.8% 
others (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2009). Singapore embraces an 
oﬃcial bilingual education policy. English, Chinese (Mandarin), Malay and 
Tamil are the oﬃcial languages. English is used as the medium of instruction 
in schools. Most Singaporean children speak at least two languages by the age 
of 3 years. As a result of globalisation, Singaporean children are exposed to 
Western cultures, values and ideas. Singapore with its mix blend of Eastern 
and Western values represents a unique case for study.
This paper addresses three main questions: (a) Are there cross-cultural dif-
ferences in the development of naïve psychology in preschool children from 
Edinburgh, UK and Singapore?; (b) Are there cross-cultural diﬀerences in the 
performance sequences on various naïve psychology tasks?; and (c) Are naïve 
psychology concepts coherent among children in the UK and Singapore?
Methods
Participants
A total of 87 children were recruited from six nurseries in Edinburgh, UK 
and seven childcare centres in Singapore. Each child was assessed on the Brit-
ish Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997) in order to ascertain 
their verbal mental age and ensure that their language was in line with their 
chronological age. Details of each cohort’s characteristics can be found in 
Tables 1 and 2. For the purpose of this study, children recruited from Edin-
burgh will be referred to as the “UK cohort” and children from Singapore will 
be referred to as the “Singapore cohort”. All participants had normal hearing 
and normal or corrected to normal vision. Parents reported no case of learning 
disabilities and/or developmental disorders.
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Table 1
Baseline measures
Measure UK cohort (n=43) Singapore cohort (n=44)
Gender 23 girls and 20 boys 17 girls and 27 boys
CA (in months), M (SD)
Range
28.60 (2.05)
25–33
29.89 (2.76)
25–34
BPVS-VMA (age 
 equivalent in months),
 M (SD)
Range
33.95 (2.96)
28–42
35.41 (3.53)
29–45
Number of languages 
 used at home and in 
 preschools, M (SD)
Range 1.09 (0.29)
1–2
2.23 (0.42)
2–3
CA=chronological age, BPVS-VMA=British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn et al., 
1997)-verbal mental age.
General Procedure
Invitation letters were sent to the nurseries and childcare centres. Consent 
was obtained from the parents, who were informed that all personal details 
would be kept strictly conﬁdential. Prior to each session, children were infor-
mally asked whether they would like to participate. Children were tested 
individually in quiet corners of the nurseries and childcare centres. The BPVS 
was administered in the ﬁrst session. The battery of naïve psychology tasks 
was divided and administered in a randomised order over a further ﬁve ses-
sions, each lasting approximately 15 min and spaced one week apart. The 
same experimenter conducted the testing across all sessions in English. All 
sessions were video-taped for later coding. After each task, the experimenter 
took an opportunity to check whether the child was becoming tired or dis-
tracted. The only feedback given during the test trials was non-speciﬁc praise. 
To thank them for taking part, children were given stickers after each 
session.
Materials and Procedure
To ensure cultural relevance, familiarity and age-appropriateness, all materials 
employed in the current study were ﬁrst piloted. These materials are shown in 
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Table 2
Demographic characteristics of UK and Singapore cohorts
Characteristic UK cohort (n=43) Singapore cohort 
(n=44)
Birth order
 Firstborn  26 (60.5%)  23 (52.3%)
 Secondborn  12 (27.9%)  14 (31.8%)
 Thirdborn  3 (7.0%)  5 (11.4%)
 Fourthborn  2 (4.7%)  2 (4.5%)
Number of siblings
 None  20 (46.5%)  18 (40.9%)
 One  18 (41.9%)  17 (38.6%)
 Two  2 (4.7%)  6 (13.6%)
 Three or more  3 (7.0%)  3 (6.8%)
Paternal education
 No formal qualiﬁcation –  3 (6.8%)
 O-Levels/GCSE or equivalent  1 (2.3%)  15 (34.1%)
 A-Levels/Higher education  1 (2.3%)  5 (11.4%)
 College qualiﬁcation or 
 equivalent
 8 (18.6%)  5 (11.4%)
 University degree  12 (27.9%)  9 (20.5%)
 Postgraduate qualiﬁcation  10 (23.3%)  1 (2.3%)
 No information available  11 (25.6%)  6 (13.6%)
Maternal education
 No formal qualiﬁcation –  4 (9.1%)
 O-Levels/GCSE or equivalent –  10 (22.7%)
 A-Levels/Higher education  4 (9.3%)  6 (13.6%)
 College qualiﬁcation or 
 equivalent
 2 (4.7%)  6 (13.6%)
 University degree  18 (41.9%)  10 (22.7%)
 Postgraduate qualiﬁcation  9 (20.9%)  1 (2.3%)
 No information available  10 (23.3%)  7 (15.9%)
Paternal working status
 Full-time  41 (95.3%)  42 (95.5%)
 Part-time  1 (2.3%) –
 Unemployed/Retired  1 (2.3%)  1 (2.3%)
 No information available –  1 (2.3%)
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Figs 1 and 2. The battery of tasks was selected to ensure that the full range of 
children’s naïve psychology could be assessed. This study is the ﬁrst phase of a 
2-year longitudinal study, so representational tasks were included to create 
consistency across phases of the research.
Battery of Naïve Psychology Tasks
The battery consisted of non-representational and representational tasks. The 
non-representational tasks included: (1) Attribution of pretend properties; 
(2) Object substitution; (3) Discrepant desires; (4) Action prediction; 
(5) Emotion prediction; (6) Level-1 visual perspective-taking; and (7) Pre-
tend transformation and mental-reality distinction. The representational tasks 
included: (1) Representational change; (2) False-belief (puppy-lemon); 
(3) Appearance-reality; (4) False-belief (hat-pen); and (5) Level-2 visual per-
spective-taking. In order to familiarise the child with the testing environment, 
warm-up trials were conducted at the beginning of each task.
Characteristic UK cohort (n=43) Singapore cohort 
(n=44)
Maternal working status
 Full-time 11 (25.7%)  36 (81.8%)
 Part-time 28 (65.1%)  2 (4.5%)
 Unemployed/Retired  1 (2.3%)  3 (6.8%)
 No information available  3 (7.0%)  3 (6.8%)
Ethnic groups
 Asian Chinese – 31 (70.5%)
 Asian Indian  2 (4.7%)  4 (9.1%)
 Asian Malay –  9 (20.5%)
 Caucasian 41 (95.3%) –
Number of preschool hours per 
week
 M (SD) 25.05 (9.44) 46.64 (12.17)
 Range  9–50  15–60
Number of hours cared for by 
non-parent caregivers per week
 M (SD) 5.13 (2.75) 30.13 (18.07)
 Range  2–9  4–70
Table 2 (cont.)
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Figure 1. Stimuli used for non-representational tasks. 1=Attribution of 
pretend properties; 2=Object substitution; 3=Discrepant Desires; 4=Action 
prediction; 5=Emotion prediction; 6=Level-1 visual perspective-taking; 
7=Pretend transformation and mental-reality distinction.
(1) and (2)
(3)
(4)
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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Figure 2. Stimuli used for representational tasks. 1=Representational change; 
2=False-belief (puppy-lemon); 3=False-belief (hat-pen); 4=Appearance-
reality; 5=Level-2 visual perspective-taking.
(1) and (2)
(3) and (4)
(5)
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Non-representational Tasks
(1) Attribution of pretend properties (Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993). This task 
consisted of two trials assessing children’s ability to follow and comprehend 
the sequence of the pretend scenarios. Children were asked to pour imagi-
nary cereal into two bowls. The experimenter then introduced characters 
from Pooh Bear and the Hundred Acre Wood Gang: Pooh Bear, Tigger, 
Eeyore and Piglet. One of the two key props was subjected to a pretend 
transformation (e.g., Piglet ate all the imaginary cereal in one bowl). The 
children were then asked to feed Eeyore some cereal. In the second trial, 
Pooh Bear drank all the imaginary tea in one cup and the children were then 
asked to feed Tigger some tea. They were scored as correct if they fed Eeyore 
and Tigger from the bowl and cup which were “full”. Children received a 
score of 1 for each correct trial.
(2) Object substitution (Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993). This task consisted 
of a warm-up trial, followed by four experimental trials assessing children’s 
ability to attribute pretend identities to substituted objects. The experimenter 
placed two separate piles of cubes, six yellow cubes to the right of the child 
and six blue cubes to the left, on the table within easy reach. In the warm-up 
trial, the experimenter introduced a Little Bee puppet to the children and 
announced, “Little Bee is hungry. Let’s give him some honey.” Next, she pre-
tended to feed a yellow cube to Little Bee while holding the block to its mouth 
and making “yummy” sounds. Then, the experimenter said, “Little Bee wants 
some more honey. You feed Little Bee some more honey,” and passed the 
child another yellow cube. After the child fed Little Bee, the experimenter 
presented Mr Frog and declared, “Mr Froggie is also hungry. He wants some 
blueberries. Let’s give him some blueberries.” The experimenter then fed the 
frog with the blue block and encouraged the child to do the same. In the 
experimental trials the experimenter asked the children to feed honey to Pooh 
Bear and Piglet, and blueberries to Tigger and Eeyore. Children received a 
score of 1 for each correct trial.
(3) Discrepant desires (Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997; Slaughter et al., 2002). 
Children were presented with two illustrated story trials in which a boy and a 
girl puppets’ favourite foods were relatively unappetising raw vegetables (cel-
ery and broccoli). Each vegetable was presented alongside an appetising food 
(biscuit and chocolate). The experimenter enacted the role of the puppet look-
ing at the food and making a facial expression of disgust while saying a long 
“Eeew, I don’t like to eat biscuits” in reference to the more appetising food. 
Then, she smiled and expressed pleasure with a long, “Mmmm, yummy, I like 
to eat celery” in reference to the raw vegetables. The children were asked to 
diﬀerentiate which of the two foods to give to the puppet. Memory (puppet’s 
favourite food) and control (children’s favourite food and the food they would 
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want to eat) questions were asked to ensure that the children were not simply 
reporting their own mental states. Children received a score of 1 if their oﬀer 
corresponded to the puppet’s preference and if they answered all memory 
and control questions correctly. Following the procedures of Slaughter et al. 
(2002), the scores of those children who did not report a preference that was 
in conﬂict with the characters for both trials were dropped from the analysis.
(4) Action prediction (Wellman and Woolley, 1990). This task involved 
three trials in which children were asked to make judgement about the actions 
of puppet characters who were seeking out objects to take to a ﬁnal destina-
tion. In the Finds-Wanted situation, the puppet wanted something (a cat) 
that might be in one of two locations and they searched and found it. In 
the Finds-Nothing situation, the puppet searched for a skateboard but found 
nothing. In the Finds-Substitution situation, the puppet searched for a horse, 
but found an appealing object (a cat) that was not what they wanted. The pup-
pets’ reasons for wanting to ﬁnd the objects were explained to the children. 
For each trial story the children were told that the puppet had searched the 
ﬁrst location and then asked to indicate whether the puppet would look in the 
second hiding location or in the ﬁnal destination. Children received a score of 
1 for either pointing or naming the correct location in each trial.
(5) Emotion prediction (Wellman and Woolley, 1990). This consisted of 
three trials in which children were asked to make judgements about the emo-
tional reactions of puppet characters in three types of situation similar to those 
described in the action prediction task. Children were asked to state the feel-
ings of the puppets either verbally or point to the cut-outs of a happy or a sad 
face. Children received a score of 1 for either pointing or naming the correct 
emotion for each situation.
(6) Level-1 visual perspective-taking (Flavell et al., 1981). The child and the 
experimenter sat on opposite sides of a table for both trials of this task. Chil-
dren were shown drawings of a bear (Pooh Bear) and a dog (Scooby-Doo) 
on either side of a poster stand. They were asked to indicate which drawing 
they and the experimenter could see. The child and the experimenter then 
changed seats so that they could see the other drawing. Children were then 
asked to report their new perception and the initial state. They received a score 
of 1 for correctly answering both their own perception and other’s perception 
questions and another point for giving correct responses to both the post-
transformation perception and initial state questions.
(7) Pretend transformation and mental-reality distinction (Harris et al., 1994, 
Experiment 3). Children were presented with two pretend trials with puppets 
carrying out two successive but related actions (e.g., Piglet is eating imaginary 
ice-cream from a container and Pooh Bear pushes him into the container). 
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Five questions were asked in each trial to ascertain: (a) the pretend identity 
of the substitute object; (b) the pretend consequences of the puppet’s action; 
(c) the pretend outcome for the puppet; (d) whether the object is pretend or 
real; and (e) the true identity of the pretend object. Children received a score 
of 1 for each correct answer, providing a total possible score of 10 across the 
two trials.
Representational tasks
The inclusion of this battery of tasks that tap representational understanding 
of mental states allows us to follow changing competence in children’s naïve 
psychology in our longitudinal study.
(1) Representational change (Flavell et al., 1986). This task consisted of two 
trials. In the ﬁrst trial, children were shown a yellow lemon that appeared 
green behind a green ﬁlter. In the second trial, they were shown a white toy 
dog that appeared red behind a red ﬁlter. They were asked to select the appar-
ent and real colours of the stimulus from three colour cards depicting the 
real, apparent and an unrelated colour. A third colour option was included to 
reduce the possibility that the children might have used a matching strategy 
to simply select the remaining colour because they have already chosen the 
other option. Children received a score of 1 on each trial for correctly answer-
ing both the apparent and real questions.
(2) False-belief (puppy-lemon). In the representational change task described 
above, false-belief questions were administered to assess children’s understand-
ing of another person’s false-belief about the objects. Children were asked 
to state what their friend would think the objects’ colours were before they 
uncovered the objects from behind the ﬁlters. Children received 1 point in 
each trial if they correctly responded to the false-belief and reality questions.
(3) Appearance-reality identity (Flavell et al., 1983). This task assessed chil-
dren’s understanding of the distinction between what an object looked like 
(appearance) and what it actually was (reality). There were two separate trials 
in which children were shown an object that had a misleading appearance 
involving discrepancy between its actual and apparent identity (i.e., a hat that 
looked like a birthday cake and a wooden pen that looked like a ﬁsh). Chil-
dren received a score of 1 in each trial for correctly answering both appearance 
and reality questions.
(4) False-belief (hat-pen). In the appearance-reality task described above, 
false-belief questions were asked to assess children’s understanding of another 
person’s false-belief about the objects. Children were asked what their friend, 
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who had not touched the objects, would think the objects were before they 
played with them. Children received 1 point in each trial for correct responses 
to both the false-belief and reality questions.
(5) Level-2 visual perspective-taking (Flavell et al., 1981). The child and the 
experimenter sat on opposite sides of a table. Children were initially shown a 
2-dimensional drawing of a turtle and asked to identify how it looked from 
their perspective and from the experimenter’s viewpoint. The child and the 
experimenter then changed seats so that they could see the turtle from the 
opposite viewpoint. Children were then asked to report their new percep-
tion and the initial state. They received a score of 1 for correctly answering 
both their own perception and other’s perception questions and another point 
for giving correct responses to both the post-transformation perception and 
initial state questions.
Analysis
Two trials were administered in most of the tasks, except for object sub-
stitution, pretend transformation and mental-reality distinction, action pre-
diction and emotion prediction tasks. Following the procedures of Gopnik 
and Astington (1988) to create a comparable scale on all the measures, the 
object substitution scores were transformed by multiplying each score by 
0.5, the pretend transformation and mental-reality distinction scores by 0.2, 
the action prediction scores and the emotion prediction scores by 0.6667. 
Due to illness, two children in the Singapore cohort did not complete all 
tasks so the numbers of children examined in individual analyses sometimes 
varies.
Results
The results are divided into three sections. Firstly, we compare both cohorts 
on all the naïve psychology tasks (non-representational and representational) 
to determine whether there are any cross-cultural similarities and diﬀerences. 
Secondly, we present data on the performance sequences on naïve psychol-
ogy tasks in the two cultures. Finally, the coherence of concepts is examined 
in the two cultures.
Cross-cultural Task Comparisons
Mean scores for each of the non-representational tasks are shown in Table 3 
and Fig. 3. A two-way 2 (culture)×7 (task) mixed-model analyses of variance 
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Table 3
Results comparing performance of naïve psychology tasks (M (SD)) between UK 
and Singapore cohorts
Mental states measure UK cohort 
(n=43)
Singapore cohort 
(n=44)
Non-representational tasks
(1) Attribution of pretend properties 1.65 (0.65) 1.80 (0.51)
(2) Object substitution 1.55 (0.52) 1.60 (0.48)
(3) Discrepant desire 1.24 (0.85) 1.56 (0.71) 
(4) Action prediction 1.22 (0.68) 0.92 (0.63)
(5) Emotion prediction 1.13 (0.68) 1.27 (0.59)
(6) Level-1 visual perspective-taking 1.00 (0.76) .93 (0.79)
(7) Pretend transformation and mental-
reality distinction
0.92 (0.49) .94 (0.41)
Representational tasks
(1) Representational change (puppy-
lemon)
0.53 (0.70) 0.57 (0.80)
(2) False-belief (puppy-lemon) 0.44 (0.63) 0.52 (0.80)
(3) Appearance-reality (hat-pen) 0.40 (0.62) 0.48 (0.63)
(4) False-belief (hat-pen) 0.44 (0.67) 0.40 (0.54)
(5) Level-2 visual perspective-taking 0.26 (0.54) 0.29 (0.64)
(ANOVA) was used to compare task performance between the two cultures 
on the non-representational tasks. There was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of culture, a 
signiﬁcant eﬀect of task (F(6, 486)=20.92, P=0.01, η2=0.21) and no signiﬁ-
cant culture by task interaction. We next examined whether there was any 
impact of chronological age (CA) on the task performance. With CA as a 
covariate, the results showed no signiﬁcant eﬀect of culture, a signiﬁcant 
eﬀect of task (F(6, 474)=3.09, P<0.01, η2=0.04), a signiﬁcant culture by task 
interaction (F(6, 474)=2.25, P<0.05, η2=0.03) and a signiﬁcant CA by task 
interaction (F(6, 474)=2.24, P<0.05, η2=0.03). These results show that 
although the children as a whole scored signiﬁcantly higher in some of the 
non-representational tasks than others, there were no gross signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences between the UK and Singapore cohorts on non-representational task 
performance. However, signiﬁcant within-culture variations in task perfor-
mance were found when CA was taken into account. Given the variety of dif-
ferent tasks in the battery and the fact that the previous literature suggests 
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that cross-cultural diﬀerences often appear at a relatively subtle level, further 
exploratory analyses were conducted to compare task performance between 
the two cultures on each of the individual non-representational tasks.
One-way between-group (UK and Singapore) ANCOVAs were used, again 
with CA entered as a covariate. The results revealed statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ferences on two tasks: discrepant desires (F(1, 80)=3.98, P<0.05, η2=0.05) 
and action prediction (F(1, 84)=5.34, P<0.05, η2=0.06). The mean scores for 
the discrepant desires task indicated that the Singapore cohort scored signiﬁ-
cantly higher (M=1.56, SD=0.71) than the UK cohort (M=1.24, SD=0.85) 
(Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparison, P<0.05). On the other hand, 
mean scores indicated that the UK cohort scored signiﬁcantly higher on 
action prediction (M=1.22, SD=0.68) than the Singapore cohort (M=0.92, 
SD=0.63) (Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparison, P<0.05).
Separate two-way 1 (demographic variable)×7 (task) mixed-model ANOVAs 
were conducted to examine the eﬀect of each demographic factor on task perfor-
mance for each cohort. The results indicate that birth order, number of siblings, 
ethnic groups, parents’ education, number of languages used and preschool pro-
grams (full-time or part-time) showed no eﬀect on task performance.
Mean scores for each of the representational tasks are shown in Table 3 and 
Fig. 4. A two-way 2 (culture)×5 (task) mixed-model ANOVA was used to 
compare task performance between the two cultures on the representational 
Figure 3. Performance on non-representational tasks of UK and Singapore 
cohorts. 1=Attribution of pretend properties; 2=Object substitution; 3=Dis-
crepant Desires; 4=Action prediction; 5=Emotion prediction; 6=Level-1 visual 
perspective-taking; 7=Pretend transformation and mental-reality distinction.
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tasks. The results showed no signiﬁcant eﬀect of culture, a signiﬁcant eﬀect of 
task (F(4, 332)=2.68, P<0.05, η2=0.03) and no signiﬁcant culture by task 
interaction. We next examined whether there was any impact of CA on the 
task performance. With CA as a covariate, there was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of 
culture or task and no signiﬁcant culture by task and CA by task 
interactions.
Separate two-way 1 (demographic variable)×5 (task) mixed-model ANOVAs 
were conducted to examine the eﬀect of each demographic factor on task 
performance for each cohort. The results indicate that birth order, number 
of siblings, ethnic groups, parents’ education, number of languages used and 
preschool programs showed no eﬀect on task performance.
Cross-cultural Comparisons of Task Performance Sequences
As shown in Table 3 and the non-representational task analyses above, 
the children achieved signiﬁcantly higher scores in some of the seven non-
representational tasks than others. This suggests that children acquire the 
conceptual understanding required to pass the diﬀerent tasks at slightly 
diﬀerent ages. Table 3 shows that, for children from both cultures, the attribu-
tion of pretend properties task was the easiest task, followed by the object 
Figure 4. Performance on representational tasks of UK and Singapore 
cohorts. 1=Representational change; 2=False-belief (puppy-lemon); 3=False-
belief (hat-pen); 4=Appearance-reality; 5=Level-2 visual perspective-taking.
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substitution task, then the discrepant desires task. The order of diﬃculty for 
the remaining four tasks diﬀered for the two cultures. As the earlier analysis 
shows, however, these slight diﬀerences between the two cultures in order of 
task diﬃculty were not signiﬁcant.
In terms of the representational tasks, Table 3 shows that there was an 
almost identical sequence of performance for the two cohorts. The order from 
the easiest to most diﬃcult representational tasks for the UK cohort was: 
representational change, false-belief (puppy-lemon), false-belief (hat-pen), 
appearance-reality and level-2 visual perceptive-taking. The sequence is statis-
tically similar for the Singapore cohort.
Another issue of interest is whether non-representational tasks were easier 
for the children than the representational ones. A two-way 2 (culture)×2 (task 
type) mixed-model ANOVA was used to compare non-representational and 
representational task performance between the two cultures. This showed a 
signiﬁcant eﬀect of task type (F(1, 81)=329.11, P<0.001, η2=0.80) but no sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect of culture or task by culture interaction. This signiﬁcant eﬀect 
of task type remained when CA was entered as a covariate. Overall, children 
in both cohorts scored signiﬁcantly higher on the non-representational tasks 
(M=1.27, SD=0.30) than on the representational tasks (M=0.43, SD=0.40). 
For instance, paired-samples t-tests indicated that the children received sig-
niﬁcantly higher level-1 compared to level-2 visual perspective-taking scores 
(t(42)=5.58, P<0.01 and t(41)=4.41, P<0.01) for the UK and Singapore 
cohorts respectively. Their discrepant desires scores were also signiﬁcantly 
better than appearance-reality scores (t(41)=5.22, P<0.01 and t(40)=7.91, 
P<0.01) for the UK and Singapore cohorts, respectively.
Cross-cultural Comparisons of Coherence in Task Performance
Another approach to investigating the relationship between tasks within 
cohorts is to look at correlations between the tasks. Several signiﬁcant correla-
tions were found among the measures after CA was taken into account. 
For the UK cohort, their attribution of pretend properties scores were signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with discrepant desires (r(39)=0.42, P<0.01). Their appear-
ance-reality scores correlated signiﬁcantly with false-belief (hat-pen) trial 
(r(39)=0.75, P<0.01).
A larger number of correlations were found for the Singapore cohort. Sin-
gaporean children’s understanding of object substitution was signiﬁcantly 
correlated to attribution of pretend properties, action prediction and rep-
resentational change (r(38)=0.38, P<0.05, r(38)=0.38, P<0.05, r(38)=0.34, 
P<0.05), respectively. Emotion prediction scores were signiﬁcantly correlated 
with discrepant desires scores (r(38)=0.34, P<0.05). Representational change 
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was signiﬁcantly correlated with discrepant desires (r(38)=0.32, P<0.05). 
False-belief (puppy-lemon) scores were signiﬁcantly correlated to level-1 
visual perspective and representational change (r=0.35, P<0.05 and r=0.68, 
P<0.01, respectively). Lastly, appearance-reality scores were also signiﬁcantly 
correlated with false-belief (hat-pen) scores (r=0.60, P<0.01).
The correlation patterns were supported by Cronbach’s alphas indicating 
that the internal consistency for the seven non-representational tasks was 
higher for the Singapore compared to the UK cohorts (UK cohort: Cron-
bach’s α=0.32 and Singapore cohort: Cronbach’s α=0.52). Similar results 
were found for the ﬁve representational tasks (UK cohort: Cronbach’s α=0.42 
and Singapore cohort: Cronbach’s α=0.68). It is noted that these values do 
not take into account diﬀerences in CA.
Discussion
Cross-cultural Similarities between UK and Singapore
The results show no gross cross-cultural diﬀerences in the development of 
naive psychology between UK and Singapore preschoolers. This is in agree-
ment with Wellman et al. (2006) who revealed a common sequence of 
understanding of mental states across cultures. The ﬁndings also support Liu 
et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis that demonstrated a universal development of 
false-belief understanding from below- to above-chance performance of chil-
dren in Hong Kong, a hybrid culture similar to Singapore.
In line with previous ﬁndings in Western cultures (e.g., Flavell et al., 1981; 
Wellman and Woolley, 1990; Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993; Repacholi and 
Gopnik, 1997), our ﬁndings show that by the age of 2 years, children’s naïve 
psychology remains largely non-representational. Children develop a rudi-
mentary understanding of four key aspects of naïve psychology, namely pre-
tence, desires, emotions and perceptions. This pattern could be interpreted as a 
consequence of two distinct developmental stages suggested by Perner (1991), 
whereby 2-year-old children have simple conceptions of pretence, desires, 
emotions, perception and beliefs without understanding these mental states as 
representations. Only around 4 years of age, do children acquire a representa-
tional naïve psychology when they recognise mental states as representational 
and not simply as true state of aﬀairs. Wellman (1990) also suggests two dis-
tinct shifts in theory formation: at 2 years of age, children acquire a ‘simple 
desire psychology’ and at 4 years of age when children acquire a ‘belief-desire 
psychology’, they understand that people’s actions and behaviour are guided 
by their desires, thoughts and beliefs. Furthermore, the signiﬁcant  correlations 
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among the non-representational and among the representational mental states 
ﬁt with Slaughter and Gopnik’s (1996) suggestion that children’s naïve psy-
chology is a coherent system of interrelated concepts. The Theory Theory pro-
poses that the cognitive path might be expected to converge at the same time 
for children, who begin with the same initial theory and undergo the same 
theory-formation processes (Gopnik, 2003).
A key issue is to identify commonalities between the cultures that might 
lead to similar developmental trends in naïve psychology task performance 
despite the apparent cultural diﬀerences. Children in both the UK and Sin-
gapore cohorts spoke English as their ﬁrst language and the cohorts were 
matched in terms of birth order and family size. The two cultures did diﬀer, 
though, in terms of number of languages used and average number of hours 
spent in preschools. From a young age, children in the Singapore cohort learn 
to switch between diﬀerent languages when conversing with diﬀerent adults. 
Frequent language switching and mixing are also observed in these bilingual 
children’s conversations with peers during play and daily interaction. Research 
has shown the bilingual advantage on naïve psychology task performance of 
3- to 4-year-old children (e.g., Goetz, 2003) so it is somewhat surprising that 
no large cultural diﬀerences were found in the present study. The fact that 
the number of languages used was not related to task performance suggested 
that children’s understanding of naïve psychology concepts depends not only 
on linguistic abilities (Jenkins and Astington, 1996). Alternatively, it could 
be that bilingual beneﬁts do not confer a more enhanced naïve psychology 
(Bialystok and Senman, 2004) or that they become evident.
Subtle Diﬀerences between UK and Singapore
The results showing no cultural diﬀerences in representational tasks are con-
sistent with studies conducted in both the West (e.g., Wellman et al., 2001) 
and the East (e.g., Flavell et al., 1983b). However, there is some evidence of 
subtle diﬀerences in non-representational naïve psychology task performance. 
While the UK cohort performed signiﬁcantly better on the action prediction 
task, the Singapore cohort achieved signiﬁcantly better scores on the discrep-
ant desires task. Both tasks assessed children’s understanding of desires. In the 
action prediction task, children were asked to predict a puppet’s action on the 
basis of the puppet’s desires, while the discrepant desire task examined chil-
dren’s understanding of subjective desires by choosing between a desired and 
an undesired food. It is plausible that the Singapore cohort performed better 
on the discrepant task because they employed emotion-based experience to 
explain desires, as shown by the signiﬁcant correlations between their emotion 
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prediction and discrepant desires scores, which was not found in the UK 
cohort. This result demonstrates that Singaporean children’s understanding of 
conﬂicting desires might be conﬁned to the notion that certain emotional 
expressions correspond to subjective desires. As highlighted by Perner et al. 
(2005), understanding the nature of subjectivity does not require an under-
standing of another person’s viewpoint so the Singapore cohort might have 
selected the unappetising vegetables for the puppet based on their objective 
assessment that this food tasted good in the puppet’s mouth. While the 
Singapore cohort developed a better understanding of subjective desires, 
their understanding that our motives for action is guided by our desires was 
still rudimentary. This ﬁnding is consistent with Meltzoﬀ et al.’s (1999) expla-
nation that children’s understanding of directedness of mental states (i.e., 
diﬀerent emotional expressions are directed at diﬀerent objects), need not 
be identiﬁed with one’s actions. Cross-cultural studies between the United 
States and China (e.g., Wang and Leichtman, 2000; Wang, 2001) have sug-
gested that compared to American children, Chinese children made more 
references to the emotional states of other people suggesting that children in 
the two cultures diﬀer in the degree to which they express empathy with 
respect to their cultural values and socialisation practices. While Western 
children are encouraged to be self-expressive and independent, Asian children 
are taught to be more sensitive about other people’s feelings. Through a grow-
ing emphasis on other’s emotional states in their everyday social interaction 
with peers and adults, the Singapore cohort in the present study may have 
developed a better appreciation of the subjective nature of desires. These 
daily interactions shape how children from diﬀerent cultures acquire various 
aspects of naïve psychology, thus contributing to the subtle variations in task 
performance.
There were also cross-cultural diﬀerences in the coherence of task perfor-
mance. Compared with the UK cohort, the Singapore cohort’s performance 
was more consistent and interrelated for both non-representational and the 
representational tasks. This cultural diﬀerence suggests that for the Singapore 
cohort, the related mental states are closely integrated such that understand-
ing of one mental state shapes the development of another mental state and 
that these mental states form together as a cohesive set of concepts. This pat-
tern of results accords with the preschool curriculum guidelines set by the 
Singapore Ministry of Education, which focus on the integration of knowl-
edge and skills across diﬀerent subject areas in order to facilitate concept 
development and promotion of Asian values and national identity (Sharpe, 
2000). The  incorporation of interdisciplinary activities in the curriculum 
helps Singaporean children to understand how skills are linked together and 
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can be applied from one context to another (Singapore Ministry of Education, 
2003). This highlights the need to consider the cultural context in order to 
investigate whether both cohorts will undergo a diﬀerent process and whether 
they will reach the same goal at the same time. The correlations among the 
non-representational and representational mental state concepts suggest that 
it is possible that the non-representational skills have a role in subsequent 
understanding of representational mental states.
Limitations and Future Research
The results of this study must be considered in light of a few limitations. One 
limitation is that task performance might be inﬂuenced by the suitability and 
appropriateness of the task materials used. However, careful attempts were 
made to ensure that the materials were culturally relevant, familiar and age-
appropriate for both cultures. Another limitation is that naïve psychology is a 
Western concept and the standard tasks were devised by scientists in the 
West: it is possible that these tasks may not draw on Eastern children’s true 
abilities of understanding of mental states. While some cross-cultural studies 
(e.g., Avis and Harris, 1991) have taken cultural diﬀerences into consider-
ation by modifying the procedures, we followed the same procedures as pre-
vious studies in order to determine whether we could duplicate the same 
results using the standardised tasks. It is also diﬃcult to design tasks that are 
equally familiar across the two cultures and may require several pilot tests. 
Most previous studies conducted in the East employed an experimental 
approach, using a battery of naïve psychology tasks to examine children’s 
understanding of various mental states. Prior research has shown that children 
talk about the mind using mental state verbs such as “want”, “need”, “know”, 
“think” and “remember” (Bretherton and Beeghly, 1982; Shatz et al., 1983; 
Wellman, 1990; Bartsch and Wellman, 1995) to express desires, feelings, 
thoughts, knowledge and intentions from 2 years of age. Children acquire 
sentence forms involving mental state verbs and their complements between 3 
and 4 years of age, which occurs simultaneously with children’s attainment on 
standard false-belief tasks (Tager-Flusberg, 1992; Astington and Jenkins, 
1999; de Villiers, 2007). Cross-cultural studies would beneﬁt from a more 
detailed comparative analysis of children’s everyday language in naturalistic 
settings. A ﬁnal limitation of the present study is that the analysis is based on 
cross-sectional data. On the basis of the cross-sectional analysis it is not pos-
sible to predict how social and culture experiences might impact on the devel-
opmental pattern of naïve psychology in the longer term. However, this study 
is part of a wider longitudinal investigation, including both standardised mea-
sures and naturalistic observations of children’s play, which may permit fur-
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ther insight into how these variables inﬂuence children’s naïve psychology 
development over the preschool years.
Conclusions
This paper has highlighted substantial cross-cultural similarities in the devel-
opment of naïve psychology among 2-year-olds in the UK and Singapore. 
However, subtle and potentially important cultural diﬀerences were identiﬁed 
in performance on two tasks and also in the coherence of naïve psychology 
concepts. Our data support Wellman et al.’s (2006) point that an account of 
children’s naïve psychology should address both universalities as well as social 
and cultural diﬀerences when examining factors inﬂuencing development. 
Further research is required to explore the impact of social and cultural inﬂu-
ences on naïve psychology development during the preschool years.
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